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INTRODUCTION

Upstaged by a dramatic series of tanker accidents in the
winter of 1976-77, the Carter Administration responded by meeting
drama with drama - the President proposed a bold set of recommendations that, if adopted, would surely improve tanker sa£ety
but would, at the same time, impose considerable economic hardship on an already faltering tanker industry.
The purpose of this study is to examine the specific construction and equipment requirements put forth in the Presidential Initiatives, as they later became known, and trace the modifications made to them before they were incorporated into the
tanker safety laws of the U.s. and of the international maritime
community.
First, I will examine the tanker operations and accidents
that were at issue in the 1970s, and the adequacy of the international and domestic standards in addressing them.

I will then

discuss each one of the construction and equipment requirements
and how they were expected to improve tanker safety and pollution prevention.

Finall1, I will analyze the methods used by

both the U.S. and the International Maritime Organization in
setting their respective standards.

It is interesting to note

the part that public opinion played in the process, the role of
governments and of the industry, and the various reasons for
which compromises and alterations were made.

BACKGROUND

In 1976, barely a month went by without a major tanker
accident, or sometimes two, three or four, occurring somewhere
in the world.

In fact, there were fifteen significant tanker

casualties that occurred between December 15, 1976, the date of
the grounding of the ARGO MERCHANT off Cape Cod, and March 27,
1977, when the MARINE EAGLE, carrying 9,000 tons of ammonia,
ran aground in the Delaware River near Philadelphia. l
Increased size was considered a major reason for the increase in groundings, collisions and explosions associated with
tankers.

The maximum theoretical risk for accidents doubled be-

tween 1970 and 1980 due to the number of significantly bigger
tankers built during that decade. 2

Very Large Crude Carriers

(VLCCs), i.e., those over 200,000 deadweight tons (dwt)3, were
first built in the late 19605; Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs),
able to carry more than 400,000 dwt, were a product of the 1970s.
But the smaller, older tankers were as accident-prone as
the larger ones.

Many were registered under a flag-of-conven-

ience 4 after having been in service for serveral decades; equipment onboard was often unreliable, and the qualifications of the
officers and crew were questionable.

The ARGO MERCHANT", a

27,000 dwt tanker sailing under the Liberian flag, was considered
a small tanker.

During the investigation after if grounded and

caused a lOa-mile slick in the Atlantic Ocean, the vessel's Mast~r

declared that vital navigation equipment had been inoperative

and had contributed to the cause of the accident. S
The offshore accidents were devastating, but those occur-
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ring in port were, In some ways, worse.

The SANSINENA, a 71,763

dwt U.S.-flag tanker, exploded in Los Angeles harbor on December
17, 1976, killing nine people and causing millions of dollars
worth of damage to the harbor facilities there.
The safety and enviEonmental issues associated with these
accidents were well-covered by the media; public interest in the
U.S. was raised to a level that demanded government action.

Ac-

tually, environmental groups had been alerted to the hazards of
tankers well before this rash of accidents.

In February, 1976 r

seven environmental organizations had brought suit against the
Coast Guard for that agency's failure to use its legislated authority to create regulations which would improve tanker safety
and pollution prevention.

This case, Natural Resources Defense

Counsel et al. v. Coleman et al.

(District Court, Washington,

D.C., Civil Action 76-1081), was in litigation at the time.
Senator William Magnuson, an environmentalist of some repute, and the new Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, led
the way in their respective arenas.

Magnuson convened hearings

of the Senate Commerce Committee and Adams appointed a Marine
Safety Task Force to address the problems of tanker safety.

How-

ever, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an independent
government body, probably played the leading role in policy formation at this time. 6

Recommendations were rather quickly de-

veloped and, by March, 1977, were ready to be presented.
President Carter had been in office for little more than two
months when he announced the lnitiatives on March 17, 1977.
a nationally televised message to

Cong~ess,

In

and, in effect, to

all other maritime countries in the world, he was firm; the U.S.
would act - unilaterally, if necessary - to upgrade standards in

-4-

the tanker industry with stricter construction, design, equipment, manning and operating requirements than had ever before
been in effect.

Five specific standards, relating to tanker con-

struction and equipment, were

~ecommended

for vessels of 20,000

dwt or more, to become effective within five years.

Before the

standards can be discussed, however, it is important to examine
tanker

operation~,

the causes of accidents and the construction

and equipment standards in effect at that time.

TANKER OPERATIONS

Oil tankers are normally of two types; the crude tanker,
which carries only crude oil, and the product tanker, which carries an assortment of refined oils.

Crude tankers have simpler

piping systems because they often carry a homogenous cargo; product tankers have need of more complex piping systems to prevent
contamination of the different cargoes.
Except for the great lengths of deck piping visible, tankers
appear, externally, to be large yet uncluttered vessels.

Inside

the cargo tanks, however, are huge steel plates and beams of different shapes and sizes which are essential for strength.

They

provide support so that the tanks will not fail, either from the
forces of the seas or from the weight of the cargo.
These internal structural members
surface area to which oil can cling.

als~

provide a lot more

The steel is not smooth,

but rough, uneven and pock-marked with thousands of minute pore
openings.?

Horizontal beams and brackets catch oil and cause it

to form small pools.

Most of the oil is pumped out during off-

loading operations, but some remains, either because it is trapped on the horizontal strength members or because it is too shal'-

Fig. l.--Tanker under construction. Cargo
tank internals have added steel framing for
strength. Pictured above is an artist's rendition of a large tanker being constructed, with
a view of the internal framing of a row of tanks.
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America, 1982
Annual Report.

SeVEI.lEO FOR WEl.OING
SMOOT~

INNER CO,.TOUA
"EOUCES MVORAUI.IC
lOSS ANO PAEVe...TS
GAS ~ORM"'T10'"

TO SUCTION PIP£

IlAOIAt RIBS PREV£~T
VOR TE X FOR ......no..
AND SET 8£LL TO P'lO~~R
WEIGHT

BOTTO,", Pt ... TIIIIG

Fig. 2.--Bellmouth suction on cargo tank
piping. The bellmouth allows pumps to draw
suction very close to the bottom of the tank.
Source: Marton, Tanker Operations (Cambridge,
MD.: Cornell Maritime Press, Inc., 1978).
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low at the pump suction opening.
The average amount of crude oil remaining in a cargo tank
after discharge is approximately 0.4 percent of the total volume
of the tank. 8

This figure increases if the oil is thicker, and

decreases if the oil is thinner or more volatile.

A product

tanker, carrying heating oils, diesel fuels or gasoline, usually
has 0.1 to 0.2 percent less clingage than a crude oil tanker.

Ballasting
One routine operation, occurring on every return voyage after the discharge of a load of oil, is ballasting.

At the begin-

ning of the 'ballast leg' of the voyage, approximately one third
of a vessel's cargo tanks are loaded with seawater to set the
ship deeper in the water and submerge the propeller.

The sea-

water mixes with the clingage on the trip back to a loading port.
At some point this oily emulsion has to be discharged to make
room for the new cargo; it is a major cause of operational oil
pollution.

Tank Cleaning
The second routine operation is tank cleaning.

Unless it

is removed regularly, clingage reduces the cargo-carrying capacity of the tanks.

For example, if 250,000 barrels (bbls)9 are

loaded into a crude oil tanker, almost 1000 bbls remain, eventually building up into a sludge that clogs cargo pump suctions,
contaminates new cargo loaded into the tanks and prevents inspections of the tank surfaces for cracks or fractures.
Tank cleaning is routinely done in conjunction with ballasting, and approximately 25 percent of the tanks are cleaned
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during the ballast leg of the voyage.

The tanker takes on bal-

last at the dock and then departs for sea.

At sea, tank cleaning

begins on thDse tanks scheduled for maintenance; once cleaned,
these tanks are ballasted, and the original ballast tanks can
then be emptied so that they too can be cleaned.
The traditional method of tank cleaning, 'butterworthing,lO,
utilizes seawater heated to 170-180° Fahrenheit to scrub the
tanks by pumping it at about 160 pounds per square inch guage
(psig) through revolving nozzles located in the tanks.

This sys-

tem removes much of the built-up sludge, but it creates the same
problem that ballasting operations create - oily emulsions.

Drydocking
The third routine tanker operation is preparation for drydocking.

All tankers must be clean and gas-free prior to en-

tering a shipyard for repairs, mainly for safety reasons but also
because few shipyards have receiving facilities to accept large
amounts of oily water.

Consequently, as a preparation for dry-

docking, the ship will clean and gas-free all of its tanks before it arrives at the yard.

Load-On-Top
Prior to the 19605, tankers were discharging all oily emulsions over the side without any treatment.

But when it became

apparent that public and government priorities were shifting,
the tanker industry, led first by Shell and later by Exxon, began using a load-on-top (LOT) system which reduced the amount of
oil-in-water pumped overboard.

LOT required no special equip-

ment, but made use of time and the density differences between
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oil and water as follows:
1) The vessel discharged its cargo and took
ballast in a third of its tanks before it
departed for sea.
2) At sea, another third of its tanks were
washed, or butterworthed.

The washings

were pumped to a slop tank, or designated cargo tank, to settle.
3) Clean ballast was pumped into the cleaned
tanks.
4) The dirty ballast, taken on when the vessel was in port, had a chance to settle.
The lower layer of water was pumped overboard.

When oil was detected in the wa-

ter, the overboard discharge valve was
shut, and the remaining oil was pumped into
the slop tank.
5) The mixture in the slop tank was permitted
to settle, and then the lower layer of water was pumped overboard.
6) A new load of cargo was loaded into the
cargo tanks, and loaded-on-top of the oily
layer in the slop tank.
LOT was touted by the oil transportation industry as the
solution to operational pollution problems, but subsequent
studies and incidents showed that it was not.

A secret study

by the oil industry in 1971-72 indicated that LOT was only about
50 percent effective. ll

The operation, when it was carried out,

was conducted sloppily; only the conscientious operators were
careful to close the overboard discharge as soon as oil was
sighted in the water.
Some tankers could not utilize LOT because their voyages
were too short to allow the emulsion to settle and separate.

And

in bad weather, no matter how long the voyage, LOT was ineffec-

~Load

on top' system of controlling
pollution at sea
After discharging cargo, a tanker requires Quantities of sea-water in some of its tanks to seIVe
as ballast. When the water is loaded it mixes with oil residues in the tanks and becomes
'dirty', During the voyage this dirty ballast water has to be replaced by clean ballast which
can be pumped back 10 the sea without risk of pollution whan the tanker reaches the loading
port, Some empty tanks must therefore be cleaned at sea to ensure that the sea-water
pumped into them as ballast remains clean and free of oil.

, During the voyage tanks to be filled with clean ballast water are washed and the oily
washings are coifected into one slop tank.
The oil in the neighbouring 'dirty ballast' tanks floats to the top.
SLO"

f.......

DUlI'fY
eLlA"
......LAST IIAU.AST

...

~

2 The now clean tanks are filled with ballast WIlier which will remain clean and suitable
for discharge at the loading port.
In the 'dirty ballast' tanks. the clean water under the oil is discharged to Iha sea and
the oily layer on top is Iransferred to the slop tank.
S'-Ot'

c;).

o .-

CUAN

ell.".

~

3 In the slop tank, the dirty washings and the oil from the dirty ballast seule inlo a layer of oil
floating on clean sea-water.

4 This clean water under the oil is carefully pumped back into the sea and the oily waste lell
on board. The next cargo is loaded on top of the remaining oil and all of il is discharged
when the tanker berths at Ihe refinery.

'Pig. 3.--Load-6n-Top. The Load-on-Top system was
promoted by Shell International Petroleum in the early
19605, as a means of decreasing operational oil pollution and also as a way to reclaim more cargo.
Source: Marton, Tanker Operations, (Cambridge, MD.:
Cornell Maritime Press, 1978).

10
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tive because the emulsion was constantly being mixed.
One author from outside the industry called LOT "little
more than a commercially technical subterfuge and an historical
anachronism. ,,12

He stated that after agitation by tank cleaning,

the emulsion contained secondary dispersions which were less
susceptible to

sep~ration,

and that the water decanted from the

slop tank could contain anywhere from 100 to 900 parts per million (ppm) of oil.
There was little inc-entive to utilize LOT for two reasons:
if cargo was

loaded~on-top

in the slop tank it could become con-

taminated and acquire an unacceptably high salt content; or, if
the Master tried to avoid contamination by discharging the slops
at a reception facility in port, he could incur extra costs for
the use of the facility and the time it took to discharge the
slops.
Exact figures regarding the

effe~tiveness

of LOT are irn-

possible to obtain because the operation was conducted in the
middle of the oceans, unrecorded by tanker officers.

It is

o~-

vious that if the system had been used most diligently, oil discharges would have dropped significantly.

But there wasn1t a

way to measure a decrease of discharges in the middle of the
ocean.

The question of use remained unanswered except for one

fact - oil in the ocean persisted.
A 1975 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) estimated tanker operational discharges as follows:
Million
Metric Tons

Percentage

LOT Tankers
Non-LOT Tankers
Drydocking

0.31
0.77
0.25

14.5
36.2
11.7

TOTAL

1. 33

62.4

13
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The rest of the vessel-source discharges were attiiouted
to tanker accidents, and non-tankers operations and accidents.

TANKER ACCIDENTS
According to the 1975 NAS Report, which is by no means defini ti ve but which can serve as a general referenc'e, tanker accidents accounted for 9.4 percent of ship-generated oil discharges
in 1973.

This figure is much smaller than the one for dischar-

ges from tanker operations, admittedly, but accidents have severe environmental and safety impacts far more intense than operational discharges.

Consider the opening paragraph of the National

Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) report on a tanker explosian:
On April 9, 1974, the tanker MIT ELIAS (Greek),
while discharging crude oil, exploded, burned,
and sank at the Atlantic Richfield Company Fort
Mifflin Terminal on the Delaware River at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The ELIAS was destroyed;

five crewmembers and three visitors were killed;
four crewmembers and one visitor are missing and
presumed dead.

The tanker siS STEININGER (Li-

berian) at the next berth was slightly damaged,
and surrounding waters were polluted with oil.
Damage to the

ARca

terminal was estimated to be

$2 million.

The sunken hulk of the ELIAS obstructed use of the berth for 19 months. 14
Explosions
Tankers are explosion-prone because of the cargo they carry, which is usually either flammable or combustible and which
must be kept away from all sources of flame, sparks or extremely
high temperatures.

The cargo is most hazardous in its vapor
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form, when it is mixed with oxygen in the air.

The explosive

range of petroleum vapors occurs between the Lower Explosive
Limit (LEL) , where the air-vapor mixture is too lean to burn, and
the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL), where the mixture is too rich
to burn.

The oxygen content in the air, however, must be at

least 11.0 percent by volume when the vapors are between the LEL
and the UEL concentrations.
Explosive concentrations depend on several variables such
as the type of oil, i.e., crude or refined products, the season
of the year, the amount of empty space in a cargo tank and the
method used to move cargo into or out of a tanker.

Typical DEL

and LEL concentrations for some petroleum oils and gases are
shown below:
Flammable Limits
Percent by Volume in Air
Product
Gasoline
Kerosene
Kuwait Crude
Ethylene Oxide
Ammonia

Lower (LEL)
1.3

0.7
2.0
2.0
15.5

Upper (DEL)

7.6
6.0
9.0
100.0
27.0 15

A tanker is at its safest when it is either gas-free, i.e.,
empty of cargo and purged of all petroleum vapors, or loaded.

A

loaded tanker has little room in its tanks for vapors to accUffiUlate; their atmospheres are too rich.

Instead, explosions are

most likely to occur when there is some type of cargo or tank
cleaning operation being conducted.

Then, vapors are exposed to

air and can be ignited by an ignition source as seemingly inane
as a crewmember dropping a metal tool on the main deck.
When the ELIAS exploded, it was discharging its load of
crude.

In its report, the National Transportation Safety Board

documented ten different ignition sources for the explosion,
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ranging from the operation of laundry equipment in the· living
spaces of the vessel to spontaneous combustion of an oily rag
left on the warm deck.

The hull and stern of the vessel were

relatively intact after the explosion; major explosion damage
occurred in the center surrounding the living spaces.

Examina-

tions after the accident showed that ventilation ducts from the
living spaces were wasted, providing ample opportunity for crude
vapors, which can travel considerable distances from a tank, to
enter the living quarters and be ignited from several sources.
When vapors travel from a tank and are ignited, the flame
front can travel back to the tank and explode it.

To prevent

this from happening, flame screens (also known as flame arrestors), of 30 X 30 mesh or smaller, are fitted on top of cargo
tank openings.

Heat from the flame

terial and the flame dies.

dis~ipates

on the screen ma-

Although these screens are vital

safety devices, they are routinely removed to measure the remaining cargo in a tank. 16

Sometimes, through carelessness, they

are not put back on the tank top after measurements are taken.
The NTSB report on the ELIAS infers that some of the flame
screens must have been removed from the tank tops, causing ignited vapors to propagate back into the cargo tanks, because
several tanks exploded in quick succession. I7

Collisions and Groundings
Although tanker explosions cause extreme damage, especially
when they occur in port, collisions and groundings constitute
about 56.0 percent of tanker accidents and account for 47.0 percent of the accidental outflows of oil into the oceans. 18
Collisions and groundings are examined together because
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they are both often caused by navigational errors. 19
The failure to keep a proper lookout, both visually and by
the use of radar, contributes to the cause of most collisions. 20
An officer-an-watch is responsible for maintaining a proper lookout at all times; he has use of binoculars, radar, the compass
and any electronic equipment for collision avoidance that is installed on the bridge, as well as unlicensed crewmen he can station on the bridge wings or on the bow to maintain a visual lookout.

Yet collisions - even between two lonely ships in the middle

of an otherwise empty ocean - continue to occur.
In his book Normal Accidents, sociologist Charles Perrow
calls marine transportation an "error-inducing" system, in which
operator error is often cited as the cause of accidents. 21

Per-

row argues that other components of the industry, such as the social organization of ship personnel, economic pressures, technological developments and difficulties of national and internationa! regulation, also cause accidents to occur.
In the authoritarian structure aboard ship, the Captain is
Master.

While it is conceivable that a junior officer might

question the Captain if he appears to be making an error in a
close situation, it is unlikely that an unlicensed member of the
crew would do such a thing.

Just prior to the collision of the

Chesapeake Bay in 1978 involving the Coast Guard training vessel
CUYAHOGA and the freighter SANTA CRUZ II, the lookout and another
seaman aboard the

CUY~HOGA

recognized the approaching danger,

were befuddled by the Captain's apparent unconcern with it, yet
did not re-report their sightings because there did not seem to
be any point in notifying the Captain of the obvious.

22

The

Captain, however, had completely misinterpreted the situation,
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thinking that the SANTA CRUZ II was a small fishing vessel proceeding along in the same direction as his own ship instead of
being a several-hundred-foot-long vessel coming toward him on a
collision course.

There was multiple loss of life aboard the

CUYAHOGA and complete loss of the vessel.
Economic pressures often develop, especially as marine
transportation costs increase; tankers can cost between $30,000
and $50,000 a day to operate.

The quietest time on a tanker vo-

yage is the time at sea (although there may be tank cleaning and
ballast shifting operations being conducted), and if a vessel is
steaming at its maximum speed, there is not much more it can do
to meet its scheduled arrival time.

However, once a vessel ar-

rives in port, pressure increases to get the cargo transfer completed and achieve the fastest possible turn-around time.

This

is when the crew is the busiest and several operations are going
on at once.

A ship's crew should be fresh and alert for depar-

ture from port; instead they are often exhausted.
Both collisions and groundings have occurred because of
steering gear failures, when a vessel is at the mercy oE the seas.
Steering gear is the term given to a series of units involved in
maneuvering a ship.

It includes:

(1) the wheel;

(2) the steering

engine-connecting device which transmits movement of the wheel
to the engine;

(3) the engine;

(4) the helm, which transmits

movement from the engine to the rudder;

(5) the rudder; and (6)

the rudder indicator, an instrument connected to a transmitter
on the rudder stock so that rudder movement is shown on the indicator face at the steering station. 23
If anyone of the steering units fail (except for the rudder indicator) the officer-on-watch must resort to an alternate
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or emergency steering arr~ngement.

Failures can occur without

warning, leaving insufficient time to utilize alternative steering methods, and have been responsible for some of the most damaging tanker accidents.

Failure of the steering gear on the

50,000 dwt AMOCO CADIZ caused this vessel to ground off the Brittany coast in March, 1978, and spill its full load of crude into
the waters there.

A further cause of accidents is over-reliance on technological improvements in navigation equipment, inducing vessel operators to take more risks.

To prevent collisions and groundings,

other ships and shallow bottoms have to be seen in advance in
order to be avoided.

Radar and collision avoidance systems have

improved one's capacity to see, but they have also encouraged
Masters to steam full-speed ahead and trust technolQgy to keep
them from dangeE.

Structural Failure
Although they do not occur as frequently as collisions and
groundings, structural failures, when they do occur, usually cause
very large oil spills because the tanks become open to the seas.
This type of casualty can have one of several causes: welding or construction defects, poor design, metal fatigue or
corrosion.

Although three major studies conducted in the 1970s

found a marked preponderance of structural failures among older
vessels (the break-point being about fifteen years)24, the newer,
larger VLCCs and ULCCs have had significant structural problems
as well.
A 1982 Position Paper by Exxon Corporation entitled

~Large

Oil Tanker Structural Survey Experience" documents the results
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of a year-long program involving the largest tankers in the Exxon fleet.

The Paper concludes that corrosion is the greatest

\

problem facing the VLCC operator and that corrosion control systerns, in the form of tank coatings, cathodic protection using
sacraficial anodes, or both, must be installed in cargo tanks.

25

Another conclusion put forth by Exxon is that reduced scantlings have reduced the corrosion margin of safety that the older
tankers have.

Scantlings, the dimensions of the steel used in

the construction process, were reduced by Ship Classification
Societies 26 as the quality and strength of steel improved, and
as

vesse~

design 'improved.

The hulls of newer tnakers are con-

siderably thinner and, as Exxon reports, have a lower tolerance
for corrosion.

Exxon's recommendation regarding this problem is

not to increase the scantlings, but to "establish more rigorous
(

standards anQ procedures for ongoing surveys of all tankers to
detect conditions that could affect their structural integrity
and pollution-free operation ll

•

Exxon prefers the cost of surveys

and steel plate renewals to the added costs of constructing
thicker hulls.
A

final word about tanker accidents is that no matter how

safe an operator might be, unless everyone is playing by the
same rules, one always has to look out for the other guy.
row sums it up well when he says:
liThe safe, well-designed Shell tanker can still
be rammed by an itinerate cargo ship with a long
list of violations; better radio communication
can mean less communication because of the chatter; collision avoidance systems are swamped by
higher speeds; larger tankers, which would reduce occasions for arrivals and departures where

Per-
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the biggest dangers lie, mean more and bigger explosions because of mysterious processes inside the huge tanks ... " 27 .

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

The purpose of international standards for tanker safety
and pollution prevention is to ensure that all nations play according to the same rules.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO)28, established by the United Nations in 1948, is charged with fostering
maritime safety generally and encouraging compliance with international maritime conventions.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil - 1954
The Pollution Convention of 1954 regulated operational discharges, i.e., those resulting from normal tanker operations in
port and at sea.

It prohibited deliberate discharges of oil or

oily mixtures containing 100 ppm or more of oil in designated
zones which included all areas 50-nautical miles (nms) from the
coast, certain special areas defined in Annex A of the Convention, and any area within lOO-nms from the nearest land along
the coast

of a nation which had declared such a zone. 29

Both

tankers and non-tankers alike were required to carry an Oil Record Book onboard to record the loading and discharging of all
fuel and cargo oils.

1962 Amendments
By 1962, when an amending conference was convened, the operational pollution problem was much worse.

The 1954 guidelines

had backfired; because there were undesignated zones in the mid-
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d1e of the Mediterranean Sea, tankers running between North Atlantic ports and the Middle East discharged the±r slops in these
zones - at an
per year. 30

appro~imate

rate of one million tons of crude oil

Other conference participants were able to document

increasing oil pollution off their coasts.
The solution proposed in 1962 was to extend the prohibited
zones from 50 to IOO-nms for new ships greater than 10,000 dwt.
New ships were defined as those " •.. for which the building contract is placed on or after the date on which [the Convention
would come into force] .,,31
The effectiveness of the 1954 and 1962 Conventions depended on the availability of oil reception facilities, i.e., receiving centers in ports to take a vessel's dirty ballast, slops,
'1 reS1'dues, t reat th em, an d rec lalm
'
'1 32
an d OlY
t h e 01.

Th ese f a-

cilities required considerable investment and their profitability
was questionable.

Countries were not inclined to require their

domestic oil industry, nor the government itself, to provide
them.
Industry response at this point in time is worth n.oting.
Industry sensed the growing, global efforts to regulate tank
vessels, and it responded by seizing the initiative and adopting
practices which appeared to achieve the same objectives as international regulations.
lnstead of develQping reception facilities in ports 33 , industry, led by Shell Oil in the mid-60s, began using the LOT
system.

LOT actually violated the provisions of both the 1954

Pollution Convention and the 1962 Amendments to it; it was almost impossible to pump out the water in cargo tanks without
exceeding the 100 ppm limit of oil when the oil-water interface
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wa$ reached.

But the international maritime community chose to

look the other way.

Industry was strong; public awareness of

the issues was weak in the 1960s.

By 1969, LOT was accepted as

the best available method of oil pollution control.

1969 Amendments
Amendments to the Pollution Convention in 1969 provided for
the use of LOT as long as the following conditions were met:
(i) the tanker was proceeding en route;
(ii) the instantaneous rate of discharge of
oil did not exceed 60 litres per mile;

(iii) the total quantity of oil discharged on
a ballast leg did not exceed 1/15,000 of
the total cargo-carrying capacity; and
(iv) the tanker was more than 50-nms from
the nearest land when it discharged. 34
Simple mathematics demonstrates that if clingage on a crude
oil tanker was 0.4 percent, and it could not discharge more than
1/15,000 of its cargo, it would have to retain about 98.0 percent of its slop oil onbaard under the 1969 Amendments.
Amendments,

~owever,

These

did not mandate reception facilities - un-

der Article VIII, governments were required to "take all appropriate steps to promote the provision of facilities."
Much has been written about IMO's inability to be effective
in international maritime affairs.

Some observers make more se-

rious charges, that IMO "has been regarded by many people as a
forum dominated by shipowners who want to minimize their capital
outlay and operating costs despite the greater risk of chronic
pollution and accidents.,,35

But IMO's actions, especially in

the 1960s, can also be seen as weak, reactionary standard-set-
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ting on the part of a relatively young regulatory body appointed to watch over a wealthy, cutthroat industry.

The industry

could, and did, overwhelm IMO whenever it took the initiative as was seen in the LOT issue, and as will be examined later in
the crude oil wash issue.

1971 Amendments
One of the first of the construction/design regulations to
be discussed in the 1970s was the limitation of cargo tank size.
The 1971 Amendments were aimed at reducing the oil pollution
from accidental causes; by setting limits on the size of tanks,
the hypothetical oil outflow that would result in the event of
a collision, for ezample, that ruptured a vessel's tanks, would
be reduced.
A pattern developed in these negotiations that continued
years later when other construction/design regulations were suggested.

Those against a proposed regulation would cite studies

that proved exorbitant costs would result and safety margins
would decrease if it were adopted.

Those in favor

wou~d

show

studies indicating that the costs were not so significant, and
that vessel safety and pollution prevention would increase.

The

final proposal would, of course, be a compromise.
The French and the Japanese, able to accommodate ULCCs in
their ports, wanted no size limitations on tanks; they cited
studies showing that the proposed size limitations would add over
10.0 percent to construction costs of tankers and would increase
the risk of explosion due to increased surface and corner areas
within the cargo tanks. 36

The U.S. and the U.K. studies showed

actual construction costs would increase 2.0 to 3.0 percent.
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The compromise which was finally chosen was to restrict cargo
tank size on tankers up to 400,000 dwt, but to allow increasingly
larger tanks for tankers above that size. 37
The significance of the 1971 Amendments was that a regulatory

me~sure

to intervene in the building process of a tanker, to·

reduce oil pollution, was unanimously approved and had a definite impact: vessels for which a building contract was signed
after January 1, 1972 were required to comply with the resolution.
Tanker tonnage on order had been increasing steadily throughout
the early 1970s and reached a peak at 200 million dwt in 1974.
The impact of the tanker size limitation/regulation I was great.

1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships
(MARPOL)
In the early 1970s, only the 1954 Convention and the 1962
Amendments were in effect, the latter having received the required
number of state ratifications in 1968.

LOT, of course, was in

use even though the 1969 Amendments regarding it did not take effect until 1978.

The 1971 Amendments regarding cargo tank sizes

were not in effect, but they were being complied with as new
ships were constructed.

Under this sketchy international regime,

oil pollution and tanker accidents continued to increase.
In 1973, in London, another IMO-sponsored conference was
convened, this time to address operational oil pollution.
Up until this time, the U.S. was against expensive pollution controls, favoring voluntary cooperation between government
and industry in establishing zones where the dumping of oily ballast and tank washings was prohibited. 38

By the early 19705,

however, environmental awareness peaked, demonstrated by the es1
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decline dramatically in 1975. Source: Meese,
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tablishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and by the
enactment of environmental legislation such as the 1972 Federal
kater Pollution Control Act Amendments, the 1972 Coastal Zone
Management Act and the 1972 Marine Protection, Resources and
sanctuaries Act.

Vessel-source oil pollution was high on the

list of concerns and, in a message to Congress in May, 1970,
Presidti~t

Nixon urged the secretaries of state, commerce, and

transportation to press for effective multilateral action, demanding "more, effective international standards for both the construction and the operations of tank vessels.,,39

The role of

the U.S. in international conferences changed; instead of favoring a laissez-faire policy with the oil industry, it began
advocating stricter regUlatory control over

i~.

Dissatisfied with LOT because it could not be enforced, and
because it was not heing used as widely as had first been expected, the

U.s.

delegates went to London with a recommendation

for segregated ballast tanks on tankers to prevent operational
oil pollution.
w~ter

Segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) kept ballast

clean by using independent pipes, pumps and tanks, segre-

gated from the cargo system, to take on and carry pallast.

Af-

Reso~ution

13 of

ter intense debate, a compromise was reached.

the MARPOL Convention required segregat.ed ballast :tanks for all
new tankers greater than' '?O, 0'0,0 dwt. ' This' was tJhe second major
construction/design requirement agreed to 'in an international
forum; although it was estimdted'to 'cost more than the cargo tank
size limitation requirement approved in 1971, its scope was much
smaller because it only affected tankers over 70,000 dwt built
after 1976.

By then, the 'tanker-building boom was over.

Other resolutions developed from this 1973 Conference, but
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they were hardly different from the resolutions from previous
conferences.

Once again, reception facilities were addressed;

Resolution 12 required reception facilities for all ports where
tankers and nontankers would have to discharge oily wastes.

But

there was no agreement as to who would be responsible for providing

the facilities, and no mandatory requirement for them.

"Special areas" were permitted to be created under Resolution 9
of the

Convent~on.

The Mediterranean, Baltic, Black and Red

Seas were to become special areas where no oily discharges were
permitted.

There was an important caveat, however.

A special

area could only become one after there were sufficient reception
facilities for the vessels transiting these seas.

The onus was

on the littoral states who were suffering the ill effects of oil
pollution - not on the oil transportation industry that was
causing them.

Safety of Life at Sea Conventions
The first International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) was created in 1948; the second was created in
n960; the third, created in 1974, is now in force today.
SOALS Conventions lay down the basic international standards
relating to the navigation of all ships on the high seas and,
although they have as their prime objective the saving of life,
~t

is clear that they are Qirectly relevant to the prevention of

collisions and strandings, and so are environmentally important. 40
There were no particular regulations relating to tankers in
the 1960 SOLAS Convention, but by the time the third one convened in 1974, special regulations regarding tankers were considered and adopted.
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Part E, Chapter II of the Convention addressed construction requirements for fire protection aboard tankers.

Tankers

built on or after the date of coming-into-force of the Convention, greater than 100,000 dwt, had to have fixed systems onboard capable of combating fires and explosions in cargo tanks.
Two systems are required; they are detailed in Regulations 61
and 62 of the Convention, and they include a fixed deck froth
system and an inert gas system, respectively.
The fixed deck froth system was to be operated by ship personnel to control fires on the decks of tankers.

Fire-fighting

froth, or foam, would be hosed onto the deck from fixed monitors
or applicatrors.

This was a relatively inexpensive system; foam

was merely injected into the vessel1s already existing firefighting system of pumps and on-deck piping.

Most tankers were

equipped with a working deck froth system, anyway.
The inert gas system, howeve,r, was much more complex and
more expensive.

It is fully described later in this study.

Most

countries participating in the conference believed that it was
the only effective method for preventing explosions on tankers,
but they did not believe that its high installation and operating
costs

could be justified on smaller ships.

Summary
Although international regulations concerning tanker safety
and pollution prevention were developing in the 1960s and 1970s,
it was at a much slower rate than that for the number of oil spills
and tanker accidents.

The successful attempt to reach agreement

on construction/design standards, however, made it more likely
tha--t similar standards could be developed in the future.

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT DOMESTIC STANDARDS

Standards developed through international conventions are
typically very general ones that facilitate agreement among sovereign nations.

Domestic standards, in contrast, are more spe-

cific; a nation develops rules and regulations by which all must
abide, and enforces them upon everyone within

i~s

territory.

Development and enforcement of standards on pollution prevention and tanker safety is the bailiwick of the u.S. Coast
Guard, within the Department of Transportation.

These standards

are codified into federal regulations under Title 33, Navigation
and Navigable Waters, and Title 46, Shipping.

Although the re-

gulations overlap, pollution is generally covered under Title 33
and tanker safety is covered under Title 46.

Pollution Prevention
Coast Guard authority to regulate tankers was greatly expanded in 1972 with the passage of the amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 41.

The FWPCA had set water

quality standards and provided technical assistance and funds to
encourage state and local pollution control programs.

The em-

phasis had been on addressing oil in the water after, not before,
it had been spilled.

But the 1972 Amendments, known as the Ports

and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)42, provided for the direct control
of vessels to reduce the likelihood of

spill~.

Under Title II of the PWSA, the Coast Guard received a mandate to create regulations for ship design, construction,

altera~

tion and repair with the express purpose of protecting the marine
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environment.

Under Title I;,.

it received authority to control

the movement of vessels in ports and in areas where hazardous
conditions existed. 43
Although the 1972 PWSA provided this legislative groundwork for preventive control over vessel-source pollution and for
improved safety equipment, the Coast Guard hesitated in using
the authority to establish stricter standards than those in effeet at the time.

The Chief of the USCG Office of Marine Envi-

ronmental Protection expressed a common Coast Guard opinion in
1973 when he said:
"I would like to see ,exclusively international
standards that all ships, regardless of their
owner, regardless of their builper, would have
to comply with; I feel that this is the best way
of reducing pollution in the oceans.
feel that this is the

faires~

I also

way to allow ships

of all flags to compete equally. ,,44 (Emphas.is
added. )

The U.S. was an active participant in ongoing IMO-sponsored
international conferences on marine safety, and the

U.s.

repre-

sentatives were none other than senior Coast Guard officers.
Coast Guard headed

U.s.

The

delegations for the 1973 Law of the Sea

Conference, the 1973 MARPOL Convention and the 1974 SOLAS Convention.

Rear Admiral R.Y. Edwards, USCG, for example, was a

member of the U.S. delegation to IMO on

l:JI served

numerous occasions and

as Chairman of the IMO Council for four terms.

elected president of the IMO Assembly in 1979.

He was

45

The political pressure on the Coast Guard was great.

Its

top officers were deeply involved in the 'quid pro quo' of international negotiations, yet they were being prodded by Congress
and the American people to exceed international standards so that
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other nations would follow suit.

As a further complication, in-

dustry was quick to protest stricter standards that would put
them at an economic disadvantage in the international marketplace.

Tanker Safety
Instead of using Title II authority it had gained from the
1972 PWSA to regulate vessel construction, design, etc., above
international standards (if necessary), the Coast Guard concentrated on Title I of the Act and began to develop vessel traffic
control systems in U.S. territorial waters.

In a 1973 study en-

titled "Analysis of Port Needs", the organization evaluated all
vessel casualties between 1967 and 1972 and rank-ordered 22 U.S.
waterways according to each one's need for some form of vessel
traffic control. 46
As a result of the study, the Coast Guard began establishing
vessel traffic systems (VTSs) that ranged from passive-type traffie separation schemes to active, advisory-type traffic surveillance systems using television and high resolution radar.

There

was already a law in effect, unique to American navigable waters,
which required operators of vessels greater than 300 gross tons
to maintain a listening watch on VHF radio while underway.

47

This

regulation enabled VTS personnel to keep in constant touch with
vessel operators.
VTSs were not established solely to improve tanker safety,
but to improve maritime safety generally, tankers included.
By 1977, only a few systems had been established.

Simple,

voluntary traffic separation schemes were operating in New York,
.Los Angeles and Seattle, and an advisory system was in effect in
San Francisco Bay.

While these systems relieved some of the
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congestion in heavily transited waters, and therefore had a
positive effect on accident prevention, they were not far-reaching enough; offshore pollution from tanker operations, and accidental spills from collisions and groundings outside the controlled areas remained unaffected by the creation of vessel traffic systems.

Summary
Domestic laws on tanker safety and pollution prevention,
because they were developed largely from inadequate international
standards, were inadequate as well.
to regulate vessel traffic in busy

The move by the Coast Guard

u.s.

ports circumvented this

problem for a time, but did not solve it.

THE CARTER INITIATIVES

The most significant international standards on tanker
safety and pollution prevention, SOLAS 74 and MARPOL 73, had
not yet been ratified by the late 19705.
ta~ing

ever,

Some countries, how-

their cue from the IMO, had incorporated the re-

quirements into their domestic laws; the u.S. was one of them.
But a series of tanker accidents in late 1976 and early 1977
caused the roles to be reversed among the international and national players - this time the U.S. acted, and it became the
country from whom the IMO took its cues.
In his message to Congress on March 17, 1977, President
Carter announced six measures designed to reduce the risks
sociated with tanker transportation.

as~

They included:

1. Ratification of MARPOL 73 and SOLAS 74
by the u.s. Congress;
2. Improvement of crew standards and training;
3. Development

of a tanker boarding program

and a Marine Safety Information System;
4. Approval of strict liability legislation
for oil spills;
5. Improvement of federal ability to respond
to oil pollution emergencies; and
6. Reform of ship construction and equipment
standards. 48
It is this last measure, the reform of ship construction
and equipment standards, that will be examined in the following
pages.

These were the most controversial recommendations because

they were costly and affected all maritime countries.
President Carter instructed the Secretary of Transportation
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to develop new rules, applying to all tankers - U.S. and foreign of 20,000 dwt and above, which called on American ports.

The

regulations included:
- Inert Gas Systems on all tankers;
- Double Bottoms on all new tankers;
- Segregated Ballast on all tankers;
- Improved Emergency Steering Standards on all
tankers; and
- Backup Radar Systems, including Collision
Avoidance Systems, on all tankers. 49
Each of these systems, as determined by the interagency task
force which developed them, wa"s to improve tanker safety or promote pollution prevention.

INERT GAS SYSTEMS
An inert gas system (IGS) is designed to improve tanker
safety by preventing the possibility of an explosion in a cargo
tank.
EXplosions (or fires) can only occur if there are three
elements in a tank: an ignition source, flammable material, and
oxygen in correct proportion to the volume in the tank.
As discussed in an earlier part of this study, ignition
sources are varied and can occur easily during tanker operations.
Lightning has caused tank explosions 50 ; static charges set up
by the flow of a stream of water onto a tank bulkhead have been
suspect of causing explosions also. 5l

Flammable materials are

always present on tankers unless the entire vessel is gas-free a rare occurrence if a vessel is in service carrying oil.

The

only positive way to avoid the possibility of fire or explosion
is to ensure that the oxygen content is below the level which
would enable ignition to occur. 52

-36-

An IGS uses exhaust gases from a ship's boilers, or inert
gases from a generating plant installed on the ship, to blanket
the cargo in each tank, thereby creating an oxygen-deficient atrnosphere.

Boiler exhaust gases can be expected to have

app~oxi-

mately the following components:
Carbon Dioxide (C02)
Oxygen (02)
Sulphur Dioxide (S02)
Carbon Monoxide (CO)
Nitrogen Oxides (NO x )
Water Vapor
Solids
Nitrogen (N2)

12.0 to 14.5% by volume
2.0 to 4.0% "
0.2 to 0.3% «
"
Traces
Traces
2.50 mg/m3 (Maximum)
Traces, in the form of soot
Balance (about 80% by volume)53
II

Similar proportions will result from inert gas generators, although the 502 content will be considerably lower if a low-sulphur
fuel is used.
Before inert gas can be piped into a cargo tank, it must be
cleaned of its corrosive solids and sulphur dioxides, and cooled.
This is done in the scrubber, a compartment stacked with ceramic
or quartz filters and capped with a saltwater spray system, that
cleans the gas and leaves the corrosive particulates behind.

A

demister is fitted to the far end of the scrubber to remove the
entrained water from the gas after it has been cleaned.

The inert

gas is then sucked through high velocity fans, or blowers, and
a series of non-return valves and seals, to prevent backflow into
the boilers.
There are two blowers in the IG system; together they must
provide at least 125 percent of the ship's total cargo pump

ca~

pacity, so that if cargo is being discharged there will be sufficient pressure in the system to keep the tank inerted while
the discharge operation is being conducted.
The IG main distribution line runs the length of the ship.
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Fig. 7.-- Two methods of atmosphere replacement. With dilution, the hydrocarbon gases are mixed with inert
gas coming in through high velocity lines, whereas
displacement involves slow, steady streams of inert
gas layered on top of the hydrocarbon gases in the
tank to gradually push them out. Dilution utilizes venting from the top of the tank while displacement uses a purge pipe that vents from the bottom of
the tank.
Source: Video Library Systems, Inc.,
Tanker Operations, New York, 19B2.
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It is fitted with pressure/vacuum valves to prevent excess pressure (which would cause a tank explosion) or excess vacuum (which
would cause a tank implosion or collapse).

Branch lines run off

the main to carry inert gas to individual cargo tanks.

Each

tank is fitted with an isolating valve so that it can be isolated
for maintenance, guaging of cargo or any other routine operation.
Venting is accomplished either through individual tank vents, or
back through the branch lines into the main and up a common mast
riser above the deck.
The IGS can be used in three different operations: inerting,
purging and gas-freeing.

The purpose of inerting a tank is to

make it non-explosive by getting the oxygen content below 11.0
percent.

Without sufficient oxygen, combustion, or an explosion,

can not occur.

The inerting operation is conducted in port while

the vessel is discharging its cargo.

As the cargo level goes

down in the tank, inert gas is piped in from the top to blanket
it.
Purging operations are conducted on already-inerted tanks
to get the hydrocarbon concentrations down below the Lower Explosive Limit.

Inert gas continues to be piped into the tank

until, either by dilution or displacement, the LEL is below 2.0
percent.

Purging is really an intermediate step to gas-freeing;

once a tank is purged, fresh air can safely be blown into a tank
without the danger of an explosion.

A tank is totally gas-free

when its oxygen level is back up to 21.0 percent.
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tankers of 100,000 dwt and above, at the 1974 SaLAS Conference.
The Convention, however, was not yet in effect because it had
not been.ratified by the required number of countries.

At the

urging of the IMO, many countries had already codified the requirement into their domestic laws.

The U.S., for example, pub-

lished final rules on the IGS requirement in January, 1976.
Although there were significant installation costs connected with the system, proof if its effectiveness, if properly
used, in preventing explosions, was undeniable.

The U.S. Navy

had uSed an inerting system for decades when it had carried its
most volatile petroleum products.

Sun Oil Company, too, had

developed its own inerting system and had been using it on the
Sun Tanker Fleet since the 1920s, with no incidences of tank explosions $ince that time. 54
So in the wake of the serious tanker explosions of the middle 1970s, especially on vessels less than 100,000 dwt, IGS was
generally accepted as a vital solution to the problem.

The

U.s.

proposal for IGS on new and existing tankers of 20,000 dwt and
above was expected to meet with little controversy.

DOUBLE BOTTOMS
Of the various construction and equipment recommendations
announced by Carter, the most controversial was the call for
double bottoms on all new tankers.

New tankers, as defined in

the package proposal that the Coast Guard developed after the
announcement of the Initiatives, were those constructed under a
contract awarded after December 31, 1979; all other vessels would
be existing

vessels~

Double bottoms are tanks in the bottom of a ship, located

-40-

between the hull plating and an inner bottom plating.

They have

so many advantages for conventional ships, i.e., passenger vessels, freighters and ore carriers, that few are constructed without them.

In fact, conventional vessels greater than 300 feet

are required" to Qeve double bottoms, while tankers, small ships
and other special-type vessels are not.
Double bottoms strengthen a ship's hull, making it welladapted to withstand the upward pressure from the sea and the
bending stresses from the ship's cargo reacting with the force
of the waves. 55

They provide space for the storage of liquids,

such as fuel oil, ballast and fresh water.

And finally, they

can provide a margin of safety in case of a grounding - as long
as the inner skin is not punctured, the vessel will still float.
Tankers are not required to have double bottoms because
their internal structural members can provide adequate strength.
There are not the same design constraints on them as there are on
cruise ships

and

freighters - no need for rooms with a port-

hole view nor for flat-bottomed floors.

Stiffening bars and bulk-

heads can be laid out all along the cargo tanks, and the oil will
simply flow around them.

The Controversy
Increasing instances of tanker groundings which caused significant oil spills suggested that double bottoms might be an effective pollution prevention device for tankers.

The U.S. first

proposed this at a 1970 meeting of the NATO Committee on the
Challenges of Modern society 56, and then lobbied for a double
bottom requirement at the 1973 MARPOL Convention.
was defeated by a majority at the Convention.

Thi~ proposal

Fig. 8.-- Single bottom and double bottom.
A tanker with a single bottom has more surface
area to which oil can cling. Double bottom tankers
have smooth cargo tank floors. Source: Sullivan,
Supertanker!, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1978).
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Proponents of double bottoms argued that the standard would
reduce operational discharges.

Pump suctions could be located

on the very bottom of a cargo tank, with piping running through
the double bottoms, providing much better drainage than that offered by the bellmouth suctions in use.

Also, sludge would not

be trapped as easily in a tank because the strength members could
be located on the underside of the inner plating in the double
bottoms~

Likewise, accidental spills would decrease.

Groundings

would not always involve an oil spill if a vessel was equipped
with double bottoms because of the
of safety provided by them.

approxim~te

six-foot margin

Structural failures would be re-

duced due to the added strength and extra support from the inner
plating.
Arguments against double bottoms on tankers concerned safety,
salvage and costs.
If the inner skin leaked, the opposition argued, there was
a potential for a build-up of explosive gases.

The compartments

would require special venting arrangements and would need to be
inspected and cleaned.
In the case of a grounding, punctured double bottoms would
fill with water and cause a tanker to loose buoyancy, making the
salvage efforts more difficult.

This argument was not a solid

one, however, because it could also be said that a firmly grounded
tanker was easier to salvage than one that was only partially
grounded and swinging about on the water's surface.
The question of costs was hotly debated in the 19705.

During

the period 1970-75, estimates for the increased cost of double
bottoms ranged from three ~o twenty-two percent of the cost of a
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vessel's construction. 57

By the time the Carter Initiatives were announced, the subject had been bantered about for over seven years.

The Coast

Guard itself had reversed its opinion in 1975 and was skeptical
about the advantages of double

bo~toms

on tankers.

Industry and

the maritime countries in Europe had long been opposed to the
measure.
An rMO working group met in October, 1977, to prepare a basic working document for the upcoming international conference. 58
It was here that the double bottoms proposal was decidedly reje'cted.

In its place was a call for protectively located segrega-

ted ballast tanks (PL/SBT).

With little hesitation, the

u.s.

delegation altered its proposal in accordance with this alternative, and did not push for double bottoms at the conference.
did, however, submit that the double bottom concept had

It

m~rit

and should be considered when deciding where to locate segregated ballast tanks.

SEGREGATED BALLAST TANKS
Segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) are tanks constructed and
used solely for the carriage of ballast.

The tanks are coated,

and they are served by separate piping and pump arrangements;
the total cost of SBT includes these initial installation costs
as well as costs associated with the decrease in cargo-carrying
capacity on the tanker.
SBT is aimed at decreasing operational oil pollution by
eliminating oil contamination of ballast water.

A ship would

be required to have an adequate number of tanks dedicated to segregated ballast so that it would never have to ballast cargo

SOME METHODS FOR LOCATIKG SEGREGATED BALLAST

Staggered Wing Tanks

Double Sides

Double Bottom & Wing Tanks

Full Double Bottom

Fig. 9.-- Design configurations for segregated ballast
tanks which give better accident protection. Source: Pedrick,
"Tankship Design Regulation and Its Economic Effect on Oil Consumers," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, (9:3), 1978.
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tanks except in the most severe weather.
But SBT oan also reduce accidental oil pollution by being
protectively located, i.e.,

~ocated

within the cargo tank length

of a tanker, outboard of or below ehe cargo tanks.

If they are

protectively located outboard of cargo tanks, as wing or side
tanks, they would reduce accidental outflows resulting from collisions or rammings.

If they are protectively located below the

cargo tanks, as double bottom tanks, they would reduce accidental
outflows resulting from groundings.

The SBT Controversy
There was little argument that SBT would decrease operational
pollution, and the protective location of the tanks was a logical
consideration; but, the costs, except on the larger tankers, was
considerable.

International agreement on the SBT requirement

for new vessels of 70,000 dwt and above had been relatively
easily reached at the MARPOL 73 Conference because the associated
costs could be recouped during the good operating years of the
vessel.

President Carter1s recommendation, however, to require

SBT on both new and existing tankers of 20,000 dwt and above, were
a serious threat to the older, smaller tankers in the world fleet.
These ships did not have many good operating years left in them.
They would not have the chance to recoup retrofitting costs those costs of undergoing extensive alterations in a shipyard.
Their small size already put them at a disadvantage in an industry where economy of scale was a big consideration - further cuts
in cargo-carrying capacity would ruin them.

Even the larger

tankers in existence were threatened with prohibitive costs.
Prior to the 1978 International Tanker Safety and Pollution
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Prevention Conference, the oil industry presented the 0.5. and
IMO with an alternative to SBT that, it claimed, would be just as
effective in reducing operational oil pollution:

crud~

oil wash.

CRUDE OIL WASH
Like the introduction of load-on-top a decade earlier, crude
oil wash (COW) was a product of the commercial dexterity of the
oil industry.58

British Petroleum and Exxon developed the sys-

tem in the early 19605, and now in the late 1970s they offered
it as the alternative to segregated ballast tanks.

The System
A crude oil wash system makes use of the ship's cargo of
crude oil to wash down the overhead, bulkheads and bottom of the
cargo tanks, cleaning these surfaces of the sediment, sand and
oil that accumulates there in the form of sludge.

A pump draws

crude oil from a designated tank, carries it through fixed piping on deck and delivers it to one or more rotating nozzles in
each cargo tank, where it hits the tank internals at pressures
greater than 100 psig. 59
The rotating nozzles are run by washing machines, most of
which are mounted on deck.

There are submerged machines as well;

they spray up from the bottom of the tank.
The fixed portion of a deck-mounted machine is clearly visible on deck and is usually of the programmable type, i.e., the
angle of spray, the cycle speed and the rotation pattern for the
nozzle can be adjusted.

Submerged machines are normally non-

programmable.
One full cycle is the path traced by a nozzle from its up-

cow

MAIN LINE

~'''SHING "'''CHINE

CAlIIQO I'U....

Fig. lO.--Typical crude oil wash system.
Crude is pumped through a main line which branches off to each deck-mounted machine and into
nozzles located within the tanks. Source: Video Library Systems, Tanker Operations, New
York, 1982.

Fig. ll.--Washing cargo tanks. On programmable machines,
the angle of spray can be adjusted to perform both top washing
and bottom washing operations. Source: Video Library Systems,
Tanker Operations, New York, 1982.
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permost position to its lowest position, while rotating through
360°.

The size and structure of the tanks will determine the

number of cycles necessary to clean them.

Tank

tops are most

easily cleaned, due to gravity, and require fewer cycles than
the bottoms. 60

But there are also numerous shadow areas in the

tanks - areas not hit by direct impingement of the crude oil due
to interference from internal structural members - that can only
be cleaned by jet deflection or splashing.

For this reason,

wing tanks, with their greater amount o£ internal structural
members, are more difficult to clean than center tanks.
The two methods of COW are the single-stage and the multistage methods.

In the single-stage method, the tank is emptied

of the bulk of the cargo before COW begins.

In the multi-stage

method, COW begins after the cargo has fallen below the level of
the tank washing machines.

The nozzles are adjusted to spray

at decreasing angles as the cargo level goes down in the tank.
With the tank nearly empty, bottom washing starts where tap washing left off.

The cycle is repeated several times as the resi-

due is pumped out through the stripping pumps.

Advantages of COW
Crude oil is considered to be a more effective cleaner than
the heated water that has been used to clean tanks.

Instead

of water scrubbing the tank internals, the crude cuts the oil residues from tank surfaces and puts them back into suspension,
enabling them to be discharged along with the cargo.
The normal amount of crude oil cargo remaining in the tanks
after COW is less than 0.085 percent of the total volume of the
tank, compared to the 0.4 percent or more that is normally left
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after water washing, or butterworthing. 61

For a tank carrying

250,000 gallons of crude (about the amount carried by a 70,000
dwt tanker) this translates into reclamation of almost 800 gallons, or approximately 80.0 percent of what would have normally
remained in the tank after butterworthing.

For this reason, COW

is considered to be practically as effective as segregated ballast tanks in reducing operational oil pOllution resulting from
ballasting operations.
Further, as industry pointed out, SBT had no e£fect on
operational oil pollution caused by tank cleaning and cleaning
associated with shipyard entry.

The tanks still had to be cleaned.

COW, however, would decrease the amount of oily emulsions resulting from these two operations as well.
Industry was willing to put up with the disadvantages of
COW if it was allowed as a substitute for SET.

For example, re-

trOfitting costs for COW installation on existing ships averaged
about $1 million per ship (although this was still cheaper than
the costs for SBT, which could run from $2 to $3 million for installation) .62

There were also the added costs that resulted

from increased port time for vessels.

COW could only be conduc-

ted while a vessed was off-loading cargo.

A

vessel which nor-

mally took twenty hours to discharge its load would require another ten hours to operate

cow

while discharging.

Industry and the fluropean maritime countries geared up to
present an attractive proposal at the 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution

~revention

Conference that would allow COW to be utilized

in place of SBT on crude oil tankers.
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IMPROVED STEERING STANDARDS
The entire steerilig gear assembly runs the length of a ship,
from the control station on the bridge to the motors, helm and
rudder in the steering compartment at the stern.
The major steering gear improvement proposed by the

u.s.

was

the requirement, on existing ships, for either manning of the
steering compartment, or the provision of two separate and independent steering gear control systems.

The requirement for new

ships was higher; the U.S. proposed either manning, or the provision of two or more independent units including both the control components and the power components.

Additionally, there

was a requirement for an audible and visual alarm installed in
the pilothouse, and powered by a source separate from the source
supplying power to the steering gear, that would automatically
activate in the event of a failure, for all ships.
The reasoning behind these equipment requirements, or in
the alternative, these manning requirements, was that there could
be an immediate response to a steering gear failure.

In a manned

steering gear compartment, a crewmember could immediately activate an emergency steering system or remedy a problem; if two independent systems were available, the alternate system could be
activated from the pilothouse (bridge) in response to the audible/
visual alarm.

The Controversy
The requirement for manning of the steering gear compartment
was a very unpopular proposal for two

reasons~

(1) there was no

method of enforcing such a requirement, and (2) there was no
training program included along with the pxoposal.

Yet the
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other U.S. proposal, the requirement for two differential control units on existing vessels, was just as unpopular.
Steering gear designs on foreign vessels were different
from most U.S. designs.

Many were powered by two hydraulic

pumps working together, instead of singly as in U.S. designs.
Dv
D~plication

of pump control was difficult to design for foreign

vessels so that both systems could operate

in tandem over the

full range of control:. 63

COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS
Collision avoidance systems (CAS) process data from

rada~

aboard ship and theoretically give bacK enouqh information to the
vessel operator so that collisions can be avoided in time.

The

system reads the vessel1s radar, gyrocompass and speed indicator
tO'determine it's own ship's course and the courseS of any other
ships picked up on the radar screen.

It sounds alarms when any

sh,ip gets too close, and the more sophisticated models recommend
alternative courses to avoid collision.
When CAS was recommended in 1977 the technology for it was
still quite new,

al~hough

the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD)

had been requiring CAS installation on all subsidized American
vessels since 1970. 64

MARAD specifications for CAS were extremely

complex, however, and despite the fact

tha~

U.S. studies indica-

ted that CAS could make dramatic contributions to tanker safct y 65,
other maritime countries wanted to delay requirements for CAS until the specifications could be considered separately, and then
standardized by the IMO.
CAS met the same fate as the U.S. proposal for double bottoms: it never made it to the conference floor.

Instead, at
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the working session in October, 1977, preceeding the 1978 Tanker
Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference, CAS was shelved pending development of an internationally-approved set of specifications and a common performance standard. 66

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TANKER SAFETY
AND POLLUTION PREVENTION - 1978

GBNERAL PROVISIONS
The Carter Initiatives proposed international action to improve tanker safety and pollution prevention.

The international

response, made by the IMO, was to convene an International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention (TSPP) in February, 1978, in London.

Conference participants agreed that all

resolutions would be packaged into Protocols, because the two
major conventions which had already been developed to address
these issues, SOLAS 74 and MARPOL 73, had not yet been ratified.
Protocols, legal instruments des.igned to enable changes to be
made to conventions which are not yet international law, were
1

used so that further improvements could be developed without having to wait for the entry-into-force of the conventions.
All safety-related resolutions would come under the 1978
Protocol to SOLAS 74 , and all pollution-related resolutions
would come under the 1978 Protocol to MARPOL 73.

When a country

ratified SOLAS 74, for example, it would be ratifying the Convention in its entirety, i.e., including the 1978 Protocol.

The

Protocol would automatically corne into effect one year after the
entry-into-force of the parent Convention.

Polarization of Participants
Fifty-eight countries attended the 1978 TSPP Conference twenty-two from the developed Western group, four from the East
European bloc, and

.

h ree d eve l
'
'
67
op~ng
coun tr1es.

th~rty-t

At one
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extreme, opposing retrofitting of SBT on existing tankers, were
the oil companies.

The United Kingdom was the leader of this

group, and the allies included the majority of the developed European cQuntries and the developing countries of Africa and South
America, as well as the Soviet bloc.
The U.S. Led the environmentalists, although its allies had
commercial, not environmental, interests.

Norway, Sweden and

Greece, for example, supported a resolution for the retrofitting
of SBT on existing tankers because of the shipyard work it would
generate, and because of the laid-up tankers that would be brought
back into service to make up for the loss in cargo-carrying capacity.
There were also some countries present who favored a compromise; they included Japan, Liberia, France and Kuwait.

They

had substantial tanker fleets, so they were concerned about the
economic hardship that retrofitting would cause, but they were
also facing a slump in tanker trade; the prospect of extra tonnage was attractive.

PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING TO MARPOL 73
There were five sections to the MARPOL 73 Convention but
only the first section, Annex I - Regulations for the Prevention
of Pollution by Oil, was affected by the 1978 Protocol.

These

changes incorporated some of the recommendations from the U.S.,
ana rejected others.
the construction and equipment requirements regarding pollution prevention were contained in RegUlation 13 of the Protocol.
The oil industry scored a major victory in that COW was accepted
as an alternative to SBT on existing crude oil tankers.
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A simplified picture of the requirements in the Regulation
follows:

For NEW

REQUIRED:

VE~SELS;

Product: 20-30 dwt

NONE

Product: 30+ dwt

PL/SBT

Crude: 20+ dwt

PL/SHT and COW

For EXISTING VESSELS:
Crude: 20-40 dwt

NONE

Product: 20-40 dwt

NONE
CBT or SBT by 1982

Product: 40+ dwt
Crude: 40+ dwt

SBT or COW by 1982; CBT can be
substituted for SBT until 1986

Crude: 70+ dwt

SBT or COW by 1982; CBT can be
substituted for SBT until 1984.

The concept of 'Clean Ballast Tanks'
into the regulations.

(CBT) was incorporated

These were tanks which formerly carried

cargo, but which would be dedicated solely to the carriage of
clean ballast in the future.

The associated pipes and pumping

could be common with the cargo system.

However, it was an opera-

tional measure, not a design measure like SBT; before clean ballast could be pumped into a CBT, the cargo piping system would
have to be flushed

50

that oil was not dumped back into the tank

when ballast was taken onboard.
At the TSPP Conference, CBT was considered an acceptable
alternative to SBT on existing product carriers of 40,000 dwt and
above.

The reasoning behind this was that the tanks on product

carrLers were usually cleaned after each voyage to insure purity
of the next cargo to be loaded; this would result in a minimum
amount of oil clingage in the cargo system and therefore a mini-
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mum amount of oil in the CBTs. 68
CBT was not accepted as an alternative to SBT on existing
crude carriers because of the greater percentage of clingage;
but it was permitted as an interim measure which would provide a
vessel with an immediate method of reducing oil pollution at very
little cost, and would give a shipowner additional time to plan
or schedule the installation of SBT or Cow. 69
Overall, the requir.ements developed for new tankers were
similar to the recommendations of the Carter Initiatives, except
that there was no standard set for new product tankers between

20,000 and 30,000 dwt.

This was not as distressing to the U.S.

delegation, however, as was the ommission of standards for existing crude and product tankers between 20,000 and 40,000 dwt.
the

u.s.

For

firmly believed that these smaller existing tankers, the

most common size in the world

fleet~

presented serious pollution

hazards that needed to be addressed.

PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING TO SaLAS 74
There was little, if any, argument about the need for inert
gas systems aboard both crude and product tankers.

All of these

vessels of 20,000 dwt and above were to be affected by Regulation
60 of the Protocol of 1978, with a few exceptions.
Crude tankers in the 20,000 to 40,000 dwt range could be
granted an exemption from the IGS requirements if it could be
proved that installation was unreasonable or impractical.

Pro-

duct tankers in the same size category would be exempt from 1GS
requirements if they did not utilize high-capacity washing machines (HCWM) to clean their cargo tanks.

HCWMs wer.e considered

a cause of tank explosions due to the static charges set up in
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the tanks when water hit the tank bulkheads.

Many small product

tankers did not use HCWMs because they carried less viscous petroleum products that could be butterworthed with low-capacity
machines.

The risk of explosion was less in these instances, and

so the requirement for IGS was dropped.

Steering Gear Improvements
Steering gear improvements, because they directly affected
the safety of a vessel and only indirectly affected pollution
prevention, were covered in the Protocol to SOLAS 74, under Regulation 29 in Chapter II - Construction and Installations.
The U.S. proposal for the manning of steering gear compartments was soundly defeated.
the pilothouse to the

Duplication of control systems from

po~er

units in the compartments was ap-

proved for both new and existing tankers, but duplication of hydraulic pump controllers, a central part of the U.S. propo·sal,
was not.
On new vessels, however, a resolution was passed which accepted the

U.s. recommendation for two identical power units to

supply the steering gaar..

Additionally, several operational re-

quirements for all vessels regarding testing of steering gear
were required under Regulation 19 in Chapter V - Safety of Navigation.

Collision Avoidance Systems
Although requirements for collision avoidance systems were
left out of discussions, a resolution was approved which urged
IMO to develop, performance standards and specifications for them
no later than JU~Y 1, 1979, and to prepare, within the same time
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period, requirements for the carriage of such aids on all ships
of 20,000 dwt and above.
An equipment requirement usually associated with CAS, the
installation of two independent radars in the pilothouse, was
discussed and unanimously approved at the Conference.
The average eost of a second radar system was estimated to
be $30,000 per ship, but ConferenCe participants agreed that its
potential benefits were worth the cost.

Primarily, it would pro-

vide a 'back-up' in case of failure of the primary radar, but it
would also improve the amount and quality of information available
by permitting each radar to be set on different bands or different
ranges. 70
The easy passage of the dual radar requirement and the resolution to implement CAS standards as early as possible satisfied the

u.s.

delegation, but, as it will be shown, failed to sa-

tisfy Congress and the American public.

THE PORT AND TANKER SAFETY ACT OF 1978
P.L. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Since the Carter Initiatives had been announced, the U.S.
Congress, led by the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, had been developing legislation to incorporate them.

The

result was the Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA), which was signed
into law in October, 1978.

Among other things, the Act required

the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe, as a minimum, "certain construction and equipment standards, including many that
are identical to requirements adopted by the international community.,,?l
Legislators did not adopt the same deadlines that the international community adopted, but established earlier dates on
which certain standards would go into effect whether or not the
Conventions and Protocols were in effect at the time.

This was in

keeping with the request of the IMO, made at the TSPP Conference
in London, that countries enact domestic legislation to implement
the Convention and Protocol standards as soon as possible.
The effective date for the construction and equipment requirements of the U.S. Act was set at June 1, 1981, at which time
the SBT, CBT, COW, 1GS and improved steering gear standards would
be required on both U.S. tankers, and foreign tankers, except for
those in innocent passage through U.S. waters.
'New vessels' were defined in the Act the same as in the international conventions, i.e., they were vessels contracted for
after June I, 1979.

All new vessels, then, had to meet the exact
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same standards as set forth in the 1978 Protocols and their parent
conventions.
Some significant standards, however, exceeded those developed
by the international community.

In House Report No. 95-1384 ac-

companying the legislation, this action was addressed:
"The committee considers that any feelings that this action on the part of the
committee in any way represents "bad faith"
on the part of

~he

United States ignores

the constitutional authority of the Congress in the legislative process.

The

committee has elected to impose additional
requirements on all U.S. vessels beyond
those which, present indications are,
would be imposed by international agreement.

It makes the same additional re-

quirements applicable to foreign vessels
which elect to operate within the navigable waters of the United States. n72

U.S. POLLUTION PREVENTION STANDARDS EXCEEDING INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
Congress indicated its concern over the international community's failure to require certain modifications on existing
vessels that it required on new vessels.

It cited statistics

indicating that aging vessels posed a serious safety and pollution threat, and noted that Lloyds of London recognized the same
problem by imposing a fifty percent surcharge to the cargo insurance premiums of certain tankers older than fifteen years.
Congress believed that these vessels should be required to meet
construction and equipment requirements similar to those requi red on both younger and larger vessels.
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Paragraph (E) of the Act applies to existing crude oil
tankers of 20,000 dwt or above, but less than 40,000 dwt, which
are fifteen years or older.

It requires the installation of

segregated ballast tanks or a crude oil wash system by January 1,

1985, or by such subsequent date on which it rBaches fifteen
years of age.

Paragraph (H) applies to product tankers in the

same size category - 20,000 to 40,000 dwt - and requires installation of SBT or, in the alternative, the use of CBT, by the same
time.
The Act also exceeded international standards in provisions
relating to the safety of navigation.

Although the international

community, at the TSPP Conference, established the requirement
for dual radars and other navigation safety equipment, the

u.s.

Congress was convinced of the need for collision avoidance systerns and wanted to enact legislation which would insure installation of these systems aboard ships.
In Paragraph (J) of the Act, the installation of computerized relative motion analyzers on all vessels of 20,000 dwt and
above was to be required by July 1, 1981.

The House Report ad-

dressed this deviation from the international requirements:
" .•• this act would require a computerized
relative motion analyzer, the type of
equipment envisioned internationally, but
for wbich specifications have not yet been
established.

It is anticipated that such

specifications will be agreed upon by June,
1979, and therefore the requirement for a
relative motion analyzer is postponed until July 1, 1981, in order to provide sufficient leadtime for compliance.

Should

it later turn out to be necessary, there
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can be a future reconsideration of
this requirement."73

Impact of Higher

u.s.

Standards

Discrepancies between

u.s.

and international requirements

for collision avoidance systems cleared by 1980.

By that time,

IMO had developed minimum standards that met the statutory test
of functional equivalency with the
specifications.

U.~.

Maritime Administration's

The U.8. had greatly assisted in

th~s

project.

The resulting equipment standards went into effect July 1, 1982.
Discrepancies concerning SBT, CBT and COWan tankers between 20,000 and 40,000 dwt, however, are still outstanding.
The latest Coast Guard report on the issue, released in
January, 1984,74 indicates that these standards will come into
force in 1985, as planned.

Final regulations are being developed.

In its report, the Coast Guard identified several impacts,
both direct and indirect.

The direct impacts were determined to

be:
(a) a 107,000 metric ton reduction in operational oil outflows, primarily on the high
seas, incurred by the year 2020, when the last
of these tankers are expected to be in service,
and
(b) a total cost, in 1982 U.8. dollars, of 1.4
to 2.5 billion for U.S. tankers and 0.0 to 1.1
billion for foreign tankers.
Indirect impacts include:
(a) modernization of the U.S. tanker fleet, because high costs of retrofitting would encourage
replacement of older tankers,
(b) shipyard utilization, because most of
the tankers affected are in the U.S. coastal
trade, and under the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, replacement of vessels in coastwise
trades must be built in the U~S.,
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(c) absorption of sunk costs incurred by
U.S. owners who have, since 1978, acted in
good faith to retrofit or construct vessels
in compliance with proposed regulations,
(d) improved U.S. domestic competition beowners with a large amount of older
tankers may be forced out of the market,
allowing new companies to enter, and
cau~e

(e) a negative effect on u.S.-foreign competition because U.S. tankers will be at
an economic disadvantage from bearing the
installation and operating costs of these
unilaterally-imposed standards. 75
Finally there is the obvious effect on international relations that accompanies unilateral action on the part of any
country.

The Coast Guard Report only cites that "unilateral

standards complicate international trade.,,76
These predicted impacts are a fair estimate of what is likely
to come to pass.

Older tankers are being replaced, although more

often by pipelines than by newly-constructed tankers.

As soon

as the 1978 Port and Tanker Safety Act was passed, American oil
companies took steps to either sell or scrap their older tankers
in the 20,000 to 40,000 dwt range.
Sun Oil Company, for example, had four U.,S. -flag tankers in
that size category in 1978: the DELAWARE SUN, the NEW JERSEY SUN,
the

E~STERN

SUN and the WESTERN SUN, all of which had been built

in the mid-1950s.

All of these were expected to be sold by 1986

or 1987, but when the regulations for SBT or COW were announced,
Sun Oil made the decision to get rid of all four of these ships
before 1985, either by selling or sorapping them.

The WESTERN

SUN is the only one of the four remaining in the fleet, and it is
expected to be scrapped by the end of 1984. 77
The U.S.-foreign-flag competition has, for at least a decade,
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been characterized as unbalanced, with the foreign flag vessels
in the better position due to cheaper construction and operating
costs. 78

The 1978 PTSA only makes the gap greater.

While unilatera1 standards may complicate international
trade, the stringent design, construction and equipment standards required on smaller, older tankers by

u.s.

laws are in

keeping with the latest international approach to a law of the
sea.
Port-state enforcement - i.e., enforcement of laws by the
country into whose port a vessel sails - in matters of vesselsource pollution was addressed at the Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III); international law on this subject was codified under Article 211(3), and gives authority to
states to establish "requirements for the prevention, reduction
and control of

pol~ution

of the marine environment as a condi-

tion for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their offshore terminals ... but without prejudice to the continued exercize by a vessel of its
right of innocent passage. 1I79

The 1918 PTSA explicitly states

that vessels engaged in innocent passage through U.S. territorial
waters will not be subject to these standards. SO

CONCLUSION

The Carter Initiatives were a bold attempt to coerce the
inte~national

maritime community into acting to improve tanker

safety and pollution

preventio~.

In the two-year period fol-

lowing the announcement of these Initiatives, the international
community created two far-reaching Protocols, and the U.S. created the 1978 Port and Tanker Safety Act.
These instruments imposed construction and equipment standards aimed at reducing both operational and accidental oil
spills.

The standards were the result not only of intense inter-

governmental negotiations, but of persistence by the American
public and innovation on the part of the international oil industry.
The standards have the potential to meet the objectives for
which they were established.

Some of the systems, such as crude

oil wash and collision avoidance, are relatively new; others, such
as inert gas, have been in use for years with results indicating
that they should have been required long ago.
International standards, by their very nature, are difficul~

to achieve because of the many interests involved.

Although

the U.S. was able to meet many of its tanker safety and pollution
prevention goals in the international forum, it could not meet all
of them.

In those cases,

the

u. S.

acted unilaterally, but wi,thin

the constraints of contemporary international law.
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